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RAD security loT security 1. Introduction 
In recent years, various technical developments coupled 
with the proliferation of smart devices and the widespread 
availability of communication networks are contributing 
to what is sometimes called a "smart world". This notion 
encompasses applications within smart cities, environ 
ment management, security and emergencies, e health, 
and many others. As more and more devices are equipped 
with computing capabilities and network connectivity, the 
notion of an Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming increas 
ingly real. Security aspects in the IoT are receiving much 
attention by the research community. The constrained 
computational capabilities, battery limitations, and network resources of these devices ( e.g., sensors, actuators, 
or mobile phones) are challenging factors to propose suit 
able security mechanisms [1 ]. 
One of the underlying technologies in the IoT context is 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) [16]. RFID systems 
are composed of tags, readers, and a back end database. 
The tags (or transponders) are small and affordable devices 
consisting of a microchip and an antenna that can be 
attached to almost every object (i.e., a person, an animal, or 
an item) for the purpose of its identification. The broad 
adoption of this promoting technology is subject to the 
development of security solutions [6.11]. In this context, 
lightweight cryptography algorithms have been proposed 
to address different aspects of their security and privacy 
requirements [20,21 ]. 
Mobility is an essential feature of many IoT devices [7]. 
Typically, a device may be moved from one point to 
another in a short time. Furthermore, there are applica 
tions such as stock control in a supermarket or asset 
tracking at hospitals that require to check the simulta
neous presence of a group of devices. To address this need, 
several mechanisms have been proposed to build an evi
dence (proof) that a set of devices remain together at a cer
tain time. Such proofs are termed ‘‘yoking proofs’’ when 
only two devices (e.g., tags or sensors) are involved [10]. 
Although they were initially conceived for just two devices, 
many authors have generalized them for larger population 
of devices, calling them ‘‘grouping proofs’’ [2,19,15].
Two relevant factors when analyzing a yoking/grouping 
proof scheme are its security and efﬁciency. On the one 
hand, these protocols must prevent an adversary to steal an 
IoT device (or borrow it for a sustained period of time) 
while passing unnoticed to the veriﬁer (i.e., an off line 
back end database connected through a secure channel to 
the RFID reader). On the other hand, the protocol must be 
efﬁcient in the sense that it should involve as little com
putational and network resources as possible for a com
plete protocol execution [18].1.1. Contribution
Existing grouping proofs were designed taking into con
sideration that the tag population may consist of more 
than two devices but that it is not voluminous. To under
stand this, we next present a motivating scenario. Let us 
consider, for instance, a library manager who is interested 
in guaranteeing that all books from the permanent collec
tion are inside the building at all times, no matter if they 
are being read in a different ﬂoor. A grouping proof is con
sidered to attest that all books are together within the 
range area at a particular time. For this purpose, a single 
RFID tag is attached to every book. The problem arises 
when the amount of books to control is very large (e.g., 
more than 100,000 titles). In these conditions, the comple
tion of the proof would take substantial time. It must be 
noted that such a time could be reduced by using several 
readers, but this would be impractical in large scale scenar
ios such as the one described before.
This particularity can be exploited by an adversary. Spe
ciﬁcally, once the tag is interrogated, she could take the 
book and leave until its next participation in the protocol. 
Since the population is quite large, the absence time for the 
adversary may be signiﬁcant. In this particular example, 
even it the protocol prevents the adversary from taking 
the book and remaining undetected, it still allow her to 
leave the protocol for prolonged periods of time at will. 
The situation is even worse if the entity communicating 
with the tags (referred to as the Reader) is untrusted. This 
is a typical assumption in yoking proof scenarios. In such a 
case, the Reader could leave the stolen book out of the pro
tocol for the maximum possible time polling it at the 
beginning of a round and at the end of the next one.
To the best of our knowledge, existing grouping proofs 
generalize the initially proposed yoking proof for a popula
tion of N  2 tags to a proof valid for a group of tags 
(N P 2) just by chaining all messages received from the 
involved entities. Unfortunately, as discussed in the previ
ous example, existing grouping proofs are inappropriate 
when dealing with a large set of devices such as thoseexisting in a library, warehouse, or the thousands of tiny
items in a jewelry shop.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst probabilistic yoking
proof with the aim of balancing security and performance
and being suitable for large scale systems. At high level,
the approach is based on dividing the set of IoT devices
(e.g., RFID tags or sensors) into several subsets with low
cardinality and poll each subset in an unpredictable man
ner. The scheme works iteratively in a number of rounds,
in such a way that potentially different subsets are rebuilt
on each protocol round, thus reducing the amount of infor
mation available for the attacker. Our proposed yoking
proof also deals with a certain notion of fairness to ensure
that all tags have been interrogated a similar amount of
times once the proof has been built.
The core of the protocol is the design of the sampling
process at each round. We present a number of mecha
nisms to probabilistically select a subset of tags at each
round, and to update the associated sampling probabilities
for the next one. The inclusion of one mechanism or
another in a PYP protocol inﬂuences the overall perfor
mance and should be done carefully, particularly because
there are non trivial trade offs among cost, security, and
fairness, so optimizing one of them may degrade another.
In order to illustrate this, we introduce ﬁve representative
sampling strategies that combine different selection and
updating mechanisms and discuss the experimental results
obtained with them.2. Related work
In 2004 Juels introduced the concept of yoking proofs. It 
consists of an evidence that a pair of tags have been 
scanned simultaneously by a reading device. It is com
monly assumed that the proof is veriﬁable at some time 
by an off line trusted party the veriﬁer. On the other 
hand, passive tags are not equipped with a battery, imped
ing the use of a clock on board, and communications must 
be initiated by the reader [10].
Saito and Sakurari showed how Juels proof [10] is vul
nerable against replay attacks [22] complementary replay 
and new attacks such as DoS or impersonation can be found 
in [2,3], respectively. To compact replay attacks, the 
authors presented a new yoking proof based on time 
stamps and introduced the concept of grouping proof as the 
generalization of yoking proofs for a set of N tags (i.e., N P 
3). Unfortunately, time stamps are predictable and Saito 
and Sakurari proof is also vulnerable to replay attacks as 
shown in [19]. In the same work, Piramuthu pro posed a 
modiﬁed version of the above mention scheme in which 
timestamps are suppressed by random numbers. Although 
this new proof is no vulnerable to the attacks suffered by 
its predecessors, the scheme resulted vulnera ble against 
the so called multi proof session replay attack [17], which 
exploits the symmetry of all the exchanged messages.
Many other proposals have appeared in the literature in 
the last years like the ones recently proposed in the med
ical context [5,14]. Some proposals focus on a particular 
aspects of the protocol  in the following we list the most2
Table 1
Notation.
Symbol Meaning
T Set of tags
Ti Tag i
R Reader
V Veriﬁer
fMgk Encryption of M with key k
PRi Result of the execution of round i
PR Resulting yoking proof
SðrÞ Vector that contains 1 at position i if Ti
participates at round r
TSðrÞ Vector that contains a random permutation
of all tags such that SðrÞi 1
PðrÞ Vector of the probability of each tag Ti
participating at round r
ATPV Anonymous timestamp given by V
IDi Identity of tag i
RNi Random number
Ki Private key of tag Tirelevant ones. For instance, there are proofs, that apart 
from the evidence generation, that aim at offering an anon
ymous identiﬁcation [3,15]. The efﬁciency in the identiﬁca
tion is the goal of other proofs which employ a tree 
structure and guarantee anonymity [4]. There exist pro
posals in which the participating tags can be read in any 
order, which is called an order independent protocol 
[12]. In [13], the authors address the existence of race con
ditions when multiple reader/tags are presented or the 
number of participating tags is unknown. Finally, we urge 
the reader to consult [8] where Hermans and Peeters intro
duce a speciﬁc privacy model for yoking proofs.
In the following we use the term ‘‘yoking proofs’’, which 
is the initial name given by Juels, to refer to as the proof 
that a group of tags (i.e., fT1; T2; . . .  ; Tkg and k P 2) were 
scanned roughly at the same time and communicated to 
each other. It must be noted that given the one to one nat
ure of RFID communications, scanning a set of tags nearly 
at the same time would require to have nearly the same 
amount of readers. As this is impractical in large scale con
texts, yoking proofs are usually built as a chain of answers 
from the polled tags. Note, too, that several terms have 
been used for the same concept in previous works, the 
most common being: grouping proofs [22], existence
proofs [19], clumping proofs [17] and coexistence proofs 
[13].3. Building blocks for yoking proofs
This Section introduces the main elements of the pro
posed probabilistic yoking proofs. First, Section 3.1 
describes the system model assumed in this work. After
wards, Section 3.2 presents the properties that a yoking 
proof protocol must meet. Section 3.3 describes the base
line yoking proof, which is a simple mechanism to build 
these proofs. The notation in use throughout this paper is 
shown in Table 1.3.1. Model
There are four entities in the considered scenario, 
namely the tags, the reader, the veriﬁer, and the adversary. 
First, let us assume a tag population T , where T i 2 T  for 
i f1; . . .  ; Ng and being N  1. Each tag has a secret key 
K i and a unique identiﬁer IDi. On the other hand, the reader 
R is the entity in charge of interrogating all tags. The veri
ﬁer V is the receiver of the yoking proof and it is responsi
ble for determining several aspects of the protocol 
execution.
Both tags and V are considered trusted. Particularly, it is 
assumed that V knows the secret key K i for all tags. On the 
other hand, the reader R is untrusted entity and acts as a 
proxy passing messages between entities. As a conse
quence of its questionable behavior, R does not necessarily 
need to follow the protocol as speciﬁed by V.
Regarding the adversary Adv, it is an entity that is able 
to see the whole protocol execution, as well as intercept, 
block and inject packets to and from any participating tag.3.2. Desirable properties
A yoking proof protocol must meet the four main prop
erties introduced below:
 Simultaneity. All tags should be scanned in a (usually
short) time interval qt .
 Dependability (against false positives). It must not be
possible for Adv to build a proof that attests that a given
absent tag Ti was present at round r.
 Dependability (against false negatives). It must not be
possible for Adv to make the system work as if a given
present tag Ti were absent at round r while passing
unnoticed to V.
 Privacy preservation. Only V must be authorized to
determine whether tag IDi is present or not at each
moment.3.3. Baseline protocol
The goal of a yoking proof is to generate an evidence 
that a tag population has been roughly read at the same 
time. Standard yoking proofs are only valid when the set 
of tags is not voluminous. In the following this sort of 
schemes are called as ‘‘Baseline Yoking Proof’’ (BYP). Our 
proposed baseline scheme is inspired on ISO/IEC 9782 2, 
and, in particular, the process for an iteration with a tag 
follows the two pass unilateral authentication scheme [9].
We deﬁne initð:Þ as the process in which for all Ti 2 T , the 
tuple fIDi; Kig is initialized. For the description of the 
protocol and because of its generality, we symbolize fXgK as 
the encryption of the message X with the key K to pro vide 
conﬁdentiality and integrity. The description of the BYP 
scheme is presented at the top of the Algorithm 1. We 
assume that before starting the protocol, the reader R 
receives from the off line veriﬁer (V) an anonymous time
stamp (ATPV ). On the other, for the ﬁrst tag interrogation, 
we set the token m0 to the NULL value (m0  NULL).3
Algorithm 1. Yoking Proof for Small Scale Environments.1: function initðT Þ
2: for each tag Ti do
3: Ti  fIDi;Kig
4: end for
5: end function6: function baselineðT Þ BASELINE YOKING PROOF (BYP)
7: for each tag Ti do
8: R! Ti : ATPV ;mi1
9: Ti: Generate a random number RNi10: and compute mi fRNi;ATPV ;mi1; IDigKi
11: Ti ! R : mi
12: end for
13: return PR fATPV ;m1;m2; . . . ;mNg
14: end functionAs previously mentioned the BYP scheme is ineffective
in environments in which tag populations are enormous
(i.e., N  102), like the ones that we can ﬁnd in the major
ity of stock applications. Let us assume an adversary Adv
who can eavesdrop all the exchanged messages for the
generation of a yoking proof and is able to identify the tags
that have already been identiﬁed from a particular time.
Under this situation, Adv could exploit the absence time
(time interval between two interrogations of a target tag)
to take away a tag that has just been read. Since the set
of tags is enormous, the absence time is not negligible, con
trary what occurs when we deal with small set of tags (e.g.,
the yoking proof generated between my passport and my
luggage at the airport). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. Probabilistic yoking proofs
Motivated from all the above, to the best of our knowl
edge, we present the ﬁrst Probabilistic Yoking Proofs (PYPs), 
which are suitable for large scale population of IoT devices. 
Section 4.1 introduces the preliminary under lying 
concepts of PYP. Next, Section 4.2 describes the pro posed 
protocol for building yoking proofs. The criteria to assess 
the performance of the proposal is presented in Sec tion 
4.3.
4.1. Deﬁnitions
In order to introduce the scheme, ﬁrstly, we need to 
provide some deﬁnitions. Let us assume a tag population 
T , where T i 2 T  and i  1; . . .  ; N and N  102. The coverage
of T i at round r of the protocol is 1, mathematically V i
ðrÞ  1, 
if the tag has been involved in the protocol. The coverage 
VðrÞ of the protocol for the whole tag population T is equal 
to 1 if all tags have participated at least one time in the 
protocol. That is, the coverage of the PYP at iteration r 
can be deﬁned as follows, where b:c function rounds a 
number to the next smaller integer.
VðrÞ 1
N
XN
i 1
V ðrÞi
$ %On the other hand, the PYP has a vector of probabilities PðrÞ
at the r th iteration of the proof, where each element PðrÞi
represents the probability that a tag participates in the
proof at that round. Mathematically,
PðrÞ PðrÞ1 PðrÞ2 . . . PðrÞN
h i
It must be noted that Pð0Þ is set to a constant value for all
tags using the InitProb function. Depending on the above
vector of probabilities and following some of the tag selec
tion strategies (TSR) introduced in detail in the next
section ðTSR 2 fD DS;D R DS;U D DS;U D R
DS;UD D RgÞ, the tags are chosen for their participa
tion in the protocol. This process is symbolized by the select
function whose input parameter is PðrÞ and it is also condi
tioned by the chosen strategy TSR i.e., selectðPðrÞÞ. The
result of applying this function is a vector SðrÞ that takes
1 value at the i th position (i.e., SðrÞi 1) if Ti is sampled;
otherwise a zero value is stored on that position. The 1
norm of SðrÞ is less or equal to the number of tags in the
population (i.e.,
PN
i 1S
ðrÞ
i 6 N). After the execution of the
select function, the set of sampled tags is labeled as TSðrÞ
in such a way that TSðrÞ# T . Particularly TSðrÞ is formed
by a random permutation of those tags such that SðrÞi 1.
Finally we deﬁne an updating mechanism, called
update(), that uses as input parameters the vector PðrÞ and
the output SðrÞ of the select function. The output of this
function consists on an updated version of PðrÞ. That is,
Prþ1ðT Þ updateðPðrÞ;SðrÞÞ Pðrþ1Þ1 Pðrþ1Þ2 . . . Pðrþ1ÞN
h i4.2. Protocol description
After introducing all deﬁnitions above, we next sketch
the proposed PYP protocol. A step by step descripton is
provided in Algorithm 2. Each tag is initialized before the
protocol execution with its identity IDi and its private key Ki.
Once the protocol starts, the probability of partici pation for
all tags is set to an initial (default) value. The protocol works
iteratively, sampling a subset of tags at each iteration
(round). Subsets are determined by V at each round. We
highlight here that the loop (while construction in
Algorithm 2) could be unrolled to minimize communica
tions between the veriﬁer V and the reader R.
PYP keeps running until full coverage is achieved. (Note 
that this criterion can be easily adjusted.) In each round, 
three main steps are performed. First, the veriﬁer V selects 
which tags must participate, taking into account the current 
vector of probabilities PðrÞ. The set of selected tags is then 
permuted by V to make the tag participation time less pre
dictable. The so formed set of tags is sent to the reader R. It  
must be noted that such a set contains only the pseudo IDs 
(i.e., we suggest the use of a randomized tree walking algo
rithm for tag singulation) of the tags to poll, thus hiding the
real IDi value of each tag. This is a common approach for tag
selection purposes with privacy protection, in which the
reader singulates tags through the pseudo ID and tags only
backscatter their IDs in an encrypted token that can only be
decrypted by the veriﬁer [23]. Using these addresses, R
performs the baseline protocol (recall Section 3.3). Upon4
completion, R sends to V the resulting set PR of responses of
all participating tags. The veriﬁer then updates the vector of
probabilities for next round.
Upon reaching full coverage, V is able to build the ﬁnal
result of PYP by chaining all intermediate results (PR). In
this process, V can determine if the protocol execution
meets the required settings, particularly if all tags have
been sampled at each round in the speciﬁed order.
Algorithm 2. Probabilistic Yoking Proof for Large Scale
Environments.
function initðT Þ
for each tag Ti do
Ti  fIDi;Kig
end for
end function
function probabilisticðT Þ PROBABILISTIC YOKING PROOF
(PYP)
Pð0Þ InitProbðT ÞÞ
while VðrÞ – 1 do
V: SðrÞ  selectðPðrÞÞ
V: TSðrÞ PermuteðfSðrÞi =S
ðrÞ
i 1gÞ
V: V ! R : TSðrÞ
R: PRðrÞ  BYP(TSðrÞ) Execute Baseline Yoking
Proof for TSðrÞ
R: R ! V : PRðrÞ
V: Pðrþ1Þ  updateðPðrÞ;SðrÞÞ
r  r þ 1
end while
V: PR fPR1; PR2; . . .g
end function4.3. Performance criteria
An optimal PYP protocol must be both efﬁcient and
secure. Furthermore, since the select() function may sample
each tag several times, it would be desirable to guarantee
that by the end of the protocol all tags have been interro
gated the same number of times. We next describe each
of these criteria in detail and discuss speciﬁc ways of quan
tifying them.
Cost The cost C of a PYP protocol is deﬁned as the
total number of messages sent by the reader
to a tag during the proof construction. Note that
in most protocols this is half the number of
actual messages exchanged, since each interro
gation implies an answer message from the tag
to the reader. In this paper, we will express the
cost as an overhead factor with respect to the
BYP protocol. Since a population of jT j N tags
would require N interrogations by the BYP, a
cost C means C N interrogations.
Security Let P1 and P2 be two PYP protocols, and let A1
and A2 be the probability density functions of
the times measured as number of protocol
interrogations between two consecutive samplings of the same tag for P1 and P2, respec
tively. Intuitively,P1 is more secure thanP2 if:
1. EðA1Þ < EðA2Þ, where EðAÞ represents the
expected value of A; and
2. UncðA1Þ > UncðA2Þ, where UncðAÞ is a mea
sure of the uncertainty of A. This can be quan
tiﬁed using a measure of dispersion such as
the standard deviation, or as the entropy:HðAÞ
X
x
AðxÞ  logAðxÞ ð1ÞThe rationale is simple. On the one hand, the less the
expected number of messages between two consecutive
interrogations, the less the time an adversary could leave
the protocol undetected. On the other hand, the langer
the uncertainty about how those times are distributed,
the more unpredictable is for an adversary to guess for
how long he may withdraw.
Both the mean and the uncertainty could be combined into
a single security measure, for instance:SecðAÞ xu  UncðAÞ
xe  EðAÞ ð2Þwhere xu and xe represent appropriate scaling factors.
This, however, may give rise to unreasonable comparisons
among proposals, since both the mean and the uncertainty
should be simultaneously minimized and maximized,
respectively.
Fairness A PYP is perfectly fair if all tags are interrogated
exactly the same number of times after the
proof completion. Roughly speaking, if IðxÞ is
the probability distribution function of the
number of times each tag has been interro
gated, fairness could be measured as the dis
tance from I to a Dirac delta distribution
d CN x
 
centered in CN. Any statistical distance
could be used for this purpose (e.g., the well
known Kolmogorov Smirnov test):D max
x
IðxÞ d C
N
x
 
 ð3Þ
5. Secure tag sampling strategies
In this section, we introduce a family of probabilistic
sampling techniques for the yoking protocol described in
Section 3. We ﬁrst describe a number of mechanisms that
are used to adjust the sampling probability for each tag
after being selected or not selected for a round. Subse
quently we describe various strategies that combine these
mechanisms.
5.1. Basic sampling mechanisms
All the tag sampling strategies proposed below rely on
the idea of selecting tags following a classical Poisson sam
pling process. This is a simple selection process where each
tag Ti in the population is sampled according to an inde
pendent Bernoulli trial. The probability of tag Ti being
selected at round r is denoted by PðrÞi (recall Section 3.3).
This probability is particular to each tag and is updated
after each round. The purpose of such updates is to provide5
the overall protocol with an adequate level of security and 
fairness while keeeping the cost down. 
We have explored several mechanisms to conduct the 
Poisson sampling process and to update the probabilities, 
both of sampled and unsampled tags. We next discuss in 
detail these mechanisms and their associated rationale: 
5.1.1. Punish participation 
As the yoking proof will be completed only after all tags 
have participated at least once, a simple way of minimizing 
the overall cost of a protocol execution measured as the 
total number of messages exchanged consists of reducing 
the sampling probability P; of all tags selected at a round r. 
Thus, once a tag participates in a round, its sampling prob 
ability is modified so that it is less likely to sample it in the 
following rounds. This can be done by simply decrement 
ing its probability by a fixed amount: 
(4) 5.1.2. Reward non participation 
Analogously to the previous case, another way of mini 
mizing the protocol execution cost consists of boosting the 
sampling probability of each tag that has not participated 
in a round. Thus, all tags that are not sampled in a round 
become more likely to be sampled in the next one. As in 
the case above, this can be done by incrementing the sam 
piing probability by a fixed amount: 
(5) 0.9 
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fig. 1. Effect of the double sampling strategy as a function of P1 and Ps. 5.1.3. Randomize probability updates 
The calculation of punishment and rewards in the two 
mechanisms described above is a critical aspect, as it 
may impact both positively and negatively different per 
formance criteria. For instance, if the sampling probability 
of a participating tag is reduced too aggresively, the cost 
would be certainly minimized, but an adversary would 
be provided with more information in a probabilistic 
sense about when it would be called again. Furthemore, 
the amount by which each tag's probability is increased 
or reduced should not remain fixed, as it would be difficult 
to keep this parameter secret from an observer. An altema 
tive would be to randomize it, for example by a random 
amount inversely proportional to P}rJ . In the case of 
rewards to non participating tags, the increase is given by: 
Pf'+1> pf'>+ u( o, 1 Pf'>) (6) 
while for punishments we would have: 
Pf'+1l Pf'l u( O,Jf >) (7) 
where U(a, b) represents a random number uniformly sam 
pied in the interval [a, b). This would contribute to make 
the sampling process less predictable to an observer. 
5.1.4. Double sampling 
Even with randomized probability updates, basic Pois 
son sampling could still provide the adversary with some 
valuable information about when to safely leave (i.e., right after being called) and when to return before his absence 
being detected. In order to introduce further uncertainty 
for the adversary, the sample at each round may consist 
of both some of the tags selected by Poisson sampling 
and some of the tags that were not selected for this round. 
A simple method to produce such a combined sample is 
the following: 
1. Let sf be result of the Poisson sampling experiment for 
tag T;. with sf 1 if T; is selected and sf O otherwise. 
2. Let sf be result of a Bernoulli sampling experiment for 
tag T; with fixed probability Ps for all tags, with S:, 1 
if T; is selected and sf O otherwise. 
3. Tag T; is selected if sf EB S:, 1, where EB represents the 
XOR logical operator. 
The procedure described above modifies the actual 
probability of a tag being selected, as to be finally sampled, 
it must be sampled either by the Poisson or by the Ber 
noulli process, but not by both. As these are conducted 
independently, the overall probability of being sampled 
at round r is given by 
Pf'l + Ps 2P)r)pB (8) 
For a fixed P8 value, the right hand side term P8 2P)'1P8 
affects differently to each tag depending on its P}rJ: those 
with lower probabilities get their chances increased while 
those with higher probabilites get their chances reduced 
(see Fig. 1 ). 
5.2. Select and update strategies 
The mechanisms described above can be combined in 
different ways to build sampling strategies with different 
levels of security, fairness, and cost. Algorithm 3 shows the 
general structure of the select() and the update( ) func tions. 
In the former, a configuration parameter DS controls 
whether double sampling is conducted or not. As for the 
update() function, parameters U, D, and R determine if 
upward (U) and downward (D) probability updates are car 
ried out, and whether these are randomized (R) or not. 6
Table 2
Tag selection strategies and the sampling mechanisms they incorporate.
Strategy Punish Reward non- Randomized DoubleAlgorithm 3. General select() and update() functions.
Global conﬁguration parameters (DS, PB, U, D, R, Du, and
Dd) are not speciﬁed as inputs.participation participation updates sampling
D-DS  1: function select ðPðrÞÞ
D-R-DS   
U-D-DS   2: S
ðrÞ ;
U-D-R-DS    3: for each tag Ti do
U-D-R   4: spi  BernoulliðPiÞ5: sbi  BernoulliðPBÞ
Table 36: if (DS and s
p
i 1) or (DS and s
p
i  sbi 1) thenCost of each sampling strategy measured as7: SðrÞ  SðrÞ [ fTig
the overhead with respect to the baseline
selection protocol.8: end if
9: end ForStrategy Cost (C)10: return SðrÞ
Baseline 1.011: end function
D-DS 5.5
D-R-DS 5.6
U-D-DS 6.41: function update ðPðrÞ;SðrÞÞ
U-D-R-DS 3.32: for each tag Ti do
U-D-R 4.83: if (D and Ti 2 SðrÞ) then4: if (R) then
5: d Uð0; PðrÞi Þ
6: else
7: d Dd
8: end if
9: Pðrþ1Þi maxf0; Pri dg10: else if (U and Ti R SðrÞ) then
11: if (R) then 
12: d U 0;1 PðrÞi
13: else
14: d Du
15: end if
16: Pðrþ1Þi minf1; Pri þ dg
17: end if
18: end for
19: return Pðrþ1Þ
20: end functionAfter a set of experiments, we have chosen ﬁve repre
sentative tag sampling strategies that combines the mech
anisms described above in different ways. The name of 
each strategy reﬂects the type of select() and update() strat
egy. For example, U D DS means that double sampling 
(DS) is conducted; that the probability of participating tags 
is reduced (D); that the probability of non participating 
tags is increased (U); and that, in both cases, such updates 
are by a ﬁxed amount (no R). Table 2 provides a summary 
of the mechanisms included in each one of them.6. Evaluation
We next discuss various empirical results related to the
performance of the ﬁve variants of sampling strategies
introduced above. We ﬁrst present the cost and fairness
of each strategy, as most of the discussion about the results
would be later very helpful for the security analysis.
All results have been obtained by simulation using
a software prototype of the probabilistic yoking proofprotocol. Experiments with different tag populations were 
conducted. For simplicity, and to facilitate the comparison 
with the baseline grouping proof protocol, all results dis
cussed next correspond to a population of jT j  1000 tags. 
As it will be clear later, the conclusions are easy to extrap
olate to populations of an arbitrary size. As for the param
eters, we have experimentally determined that the best 
results were obtained for low values of Du; Dd, and PB 
(e.g., around 0.2). The ﬁgures provided in this section cor
respond to averages over various executions.
The last part of this section is devoted to determining 
whether the proposal meets the desired properties intro
duced in Section 3.2.
6.1. Cost
Table 3 shows the overhead incurred by each sampling 
variant as a multiplying factor with respect to the baseline 
yoking proof protocol (BYP). As it can be observed, the 
inclusion of one sampling mechanism or another has a sig
niﬁcant impact in the overall cost of the protocol. Several 
conclusions can be drawn:
1. TheU D R andU D R DS variants constitute the cheaper
strategies, requiring 3.3 and 4.8 times more messages
than the baseline protocol. This is reasonable, as the
inclusionof both theUandDmechanismsmakes it easier
for the protocol to sample rather disjoint subsets of tags
at each round. Overall, this reduces the total number of
messages required to sample all tags. Furthermore, dou
ble sampling is crucial to further reduce the cost.
2. When both U and D are included, non randomized
updates make the protocol very slow compare U D
R DS (3.3) to U D DS (6.4). There is a simple explana
tion for this. Consider a tag T i that at some round r
has a very high probability PðrÞi of being sampled. If it
gets sampled, at round r þ 1 its probability is decreased
by Dd. If at round r þ 1 it does not get sampled, then
Pðrþ2Þi is again increased. The overall effect is that after7
  a few rounds most tags get sampling probabilities rea 
sonably high and the overall strategy degenerates to 
an almost purely Bernoulli sampling (i.e., with all tags 
having roughly the same probability). 
3. Finally, strategies that only apply either U or D in our 
case, D DS and D R DS have a relatively high cost too. 
The reason for this is also straightforward. As non par 
ticipating tags are not rewarded, the sampling process 
progressively reduces the probability of all tags until 
it becomes uniformly low. At this point, the strategy 
degenerates to a Bernoulli sampling as in the case 
above. Randomization does not have much influence 
here as it does not prevent this effect from happening. 
6.2. Fairness 
Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the number of t imes a 
tag is interrogated during a full protocol execution. These 
distributions must be interpreted considering the cost of
each strategy (Table 3). Recall that, ideally, all tags should 
participate the same number of times although, as dis 
cussed in Section 4.3, this would negatively impact the 
security of the scheme. 
In general, all strategies are reasonably fair: for a 
popula tion of 1000 tags and a number of messages ranging 
from 3300 (UDR DS) to 6400 (U DDS), the number of
times the same tag is interrogated ranges between 1 and 
10, with the great majority of them falling in the [1,7] 
interval. All dis tributions are slightly biased towards the 
left (i.e., the have positive skew), meaning that most tags 
are interrogated Jess than the optimal number of times. An 
exception is the U D DS strategy, which performs 
significantly better than the others in terms of fairness. This 
is a side effect of the situation described in the previous 
section, namely that it rapidly degenerates to a purely 
Bernoulli process, which is optimal fairness wise. U-D-R D-DS 
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Number of times a tag is sel
fig. 2. Fairness results for ea6.3. Security 
We have first measured the number of messages 
between two consecutive interrogations of the same tag 
for all strategies, averaging the result over several simula 
tions. The obtained distributions are shown in Fig. 3 and pro 
vide a graphical view of the different security levels offered 
by each strategy. For comparison purposes, the equivalent 
"curve" for the baseline strategy is also depicted. 
The first noticeable fact is that all distributions are 
roughly normal with varying means and standard devia 
tions. Both parameters are related to the security of each 
strategy. On the one hand, the lower the mean, the Jess time 
an adversary can leave without being detected. On the other 
hand, the larger the standard deviation, the more the 
chances of being interrogated sooner or later than expected 
(i.e., the more the uncertainty about the average number of 
messages he can miss). Even though these and other param 
eters about the shape of the distribution could be easily 
combined into a single security measure, in what follows 
we choose to discuss them separately for each strategy. 
To facilitate the comparative analysis, Table4 shows the 
mean, the standard deviation, the quartiles Q1 , Qi, and °"3, 
and the entropy for the five distributions. In terms of low 
mean and high standard devition, the best two strategies 
are D DS and U D R, respectively. In the D DS case a tag is 
interrogated, on average, every 362 messages, with a stan 
dard deviation of 217. In the case ofU D R, the average num 
ber of messages between consecutive interrogations 
increases to 450, but the uncertainty for the adversary is 
greater as the standard deviation also increases to 405. The 
remaining three strategies are slightly worse than these 
two in terms of time between consecutive interrogations, 
although their standard deviation is better than that of the 
D DS strategy. In all cases, the situation for the adversary 
is considerably worse than in the baseline scenario, in which 
the mean is 999 messages with no deviation 8
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Table4 
Representative statistics of the distribution of the number of consecutive 
messages an adversary can leave without being detected 
Strategy Mean Std QI Qi (h H 
0 -DS 362 217 239 338 448 3.32 
0 -R-DS 578 269 403 571 738 2.92 
U-0-DS 497 268 341 483 629 3.1 9 
U-0-R-DS 497 241 344 481 631 2.96 
U-0-R 450 405 244 377 544 2.93 
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Fig. 4. Probability of interrogating a tag as a function of the number of 
messages since the last time it was interrogated. Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distribution functions for 
the probability distributions discussed above. From the 
adversary's point of view, these curves can be easily inter 
preted as the probability of being interrogated after a cer 
tain number of messages since the last time he 
participated in the protocol. The different security levels 
provided by each strategy are more noticeable here and 
reinforce the views discussed above. 
6.4. Properties assessment 
We next discuss whether the proposed PIP protocol 
meets the simultaneity, dependability and privacy proper 
ties that are required for all yoking proofs protocols. Each 
property is discussed below: 
• Simultaneity. After a correct protocol execution, tags 
are sampled in the rounds and in the order determined 
by V. In this way, V (which is a trusted entity) ensures 
that all tags are scanned within a predefined time 
interval. 
• Dependability (against false positives). Adv is unable to 
build a proof on behalf ofan absent tag since all responses 
are encrypted using a key which is unknown to Adv. 
• Dependability (against false negatives). Given that V 
receives the result of each round (PR), it is able to check 
whether all tags that should take part in the round did 
so. Thus, any false negative would be noticed by V. 
• Privacy preservation. Given that only V knows the real 
identities ID; of each tag, Adv is unable to know if a given 
tag is present or not at each round. It must be noted that 
this information is also unknown to R. For preserving pri vacy at the tag singulation stage, a randomized tree 
walking protocol is employed, using a pseudonym for 
the tag identification. As consequence of this, TS only 
contains the pseudo ID of the tags to be polled. On the 
other hand, tags' answers are anonymized by the use of 
nonces and tokens are encrypted with K; before passing 
through the insecure radio channel. Therefore, confiden 
tial information is inaccessible to unauthorized entities 
like the adversary or the untrusted reader, and only the 
verifier who knows K; can access to its content. 7. Conclusions 
In many loT scenarios it is necessary to construct an evi 
dence that several objects have been scanned simulta 
neously by a reader. As introduced by Juels in 2004, 
classical yoking proofs constructions achieve this in a 
secure and efficient manner. However, such protocols were 
designed for applications where only a few tags (typically 
just two) are involved. As a result, issues such as the order 
in which each tag participates in the protocol are not rele 
vant, nor it is the question of how many times a tag should 
be interrogated, as the proof completion time is often too 
little to worry about a tag leaving right after answering 
to the reader. This is not the case for many loT applications 
where a potentially very large population of objects must 
be grouped together efficiently and guaranteeing that 
objects do not abandon the protocol undetected. 
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of probabi 
listic yoking proofs (PYP) to address this issue. The proof 
itself is built as in classical yoking constructions. The key 
idea in a PYP consists of selecting at each round a subset 
of tags according to a Poisson sampling process where 
the sampling probability of each object varies over time. 
We have introduced various sampling mechanisms that 
attempt to balance security and efficiency, and have pro 
posed different sampling strategies that combine them. 
Our experimental results suggest that some of these strat 
egies give rise to PYP protocols with a very good trade off 
among security, efficiency, and fairness. 9
Future work will be focused on two aspects. First, the pro 
posal will be extended for more complex scenarios in which 
multiple readers could take part in the protocol. Second, a 
formal privacy assessment will be conducted over the 
protocol. 
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